When the Internet first became accessible around the world, optimists hoped that it would be able to defeat authoritarian regimes’ ability to control information. It was thought that authoritarian states would be powerless to fend off the information revolution made possible by the decentralized nature of the Internet. In 2000, US President Bill Clinton famously likened China’s attempts to dominate cyberspace to “an attempt to nail Jell-O to a wall.”
However, Chinese leaders did not think so. Initially, they had no comprehensive plan, but spent decades developing tactics that nailed the proverbial Jell-O to China’s Great Firewall. The Chinese government’s approach to taming the information revolution is unique, with a focus on controlling access to the internet, not just censoring content on the internet.Chinese authorities prioritize knowing who Because it’s online, potential threats can be identified, tracked, threatened, and punished.
This concept, which the Chinese government calls “battlefield control,” underpins one of Beijing’s most widely used surveillance tactics, both online and offline. Cyberspace has become a new battlefield for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which views crushing any threats to its power as a life-or-death struggle. And the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t just rely on technology to control it. It is also using technology to know when and where to deploy additional police personnel to the front lines of the war for public control, such as train stations, shopping malls, hotels and universities.
To control the cyberspace battlefield, the government relies on two institutions for surveillance: the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which is part of the Chinese Communist Party, and the police force. Party censors decide what content is blocked or filtered, while police enforce censorship through tactics such as installing surveillance hardware, blocking and filtering suspects’ communications, and conducting searches and arrests. .
Although the Chinese Communist Party began asserting control over the internet in the mid-1990s, it was only in 2014 that it established the Central Cybersecurity and Informatization Guidance Group, a national integrated body with both regulatory and censorship responsibilities. did. (In 2018, President Xi Jinping elevated the body to the status of central committee.) Meanwhile, local governments have set up equivalent offices attached to the CPC committees.
The local agency of the Cyberspace Affairs Commission (which I will refer to as the “cyber agency”) lacks the personnel and technical capacity to carry out sophisticated surveillance. Instead, their primary mission is routine censorship and dissemination of disinformation. For example, the municipal cyber agency in Yongnan City, a city of just under 3 million people, reported that by the late 2010s it was using big data and cloud computing to monitor online public opinion. In 2019, authorities monitored 515,000 online pieces of information about Longnan, of which 8,000 were deemed negative. Local cyber agencies are also recruiting internet commentators and running online campaigns aimed at manipulating public opinion and spreading disinformation.
Meanwhile, the cyber police force is responsible for enforcement and surveillance. Cyber police were first organized in public security bureaus (PSBs) across China in the early 2000s. Yan’an’s cyber police force reported that its main mission includes “monitoring and controlling harmful information.” Collect, analyze and report developments on the Internet. Tightening regulations on Internet cafes. and investigating and dealing with cybercrime. ” His local PSB cyber police force is relatively small despite carrying out such tasks. A typical county cyber police force has about five to six officers.
Local cyber agencies and cyber police forces have both deployed high-tech solutions to patrol the internet 24/7. For example, the cyber agency in Santai County uses a web monitoring technology called Real Time eXchange. Cyber police officers are required to report important developments not only to the PSB leadership, but also to the county party committee and the government.
Although local records do not specify this, it appears that cyber agencies decide what content to remove and block, and instruct police to do so. For example, the cyber police unit of Ergun’s municipal PSB said it was responsible for “organizing and carrying out the ‘day-to-day operations’ of Ergun’s cyber institutions.” (“Routine business” almost certainly refers to the censorship of online content.) Reports that cyber police have accepted bribes from businessmen to remove important posts have also been reported to the extent that cyber police are tasked with enforcement. It also shows that Additionally, when the cyber agency finds online material that requires investigation, it alerts the cyber police. For example, as soon as the Yunlian County Cyber Agency noticed what it called a serious “Internet rumor” in 2017, it contacted the Cyber Department of the Prefecture PSB to investigate.
This division of roles is rational for management purposes. There is no need to duplicate technical capabilities across government agencies, and residential surveillance capabilities in police buildings pose less security risk because they are more heavily guarded than government buildings. Police also operate China’s public information network security surveillance and control system, the so-called Great Firewall.
Surveillance and control work is labor-intensive, requiring cyber police to conduct in-person investigations and visit individuals suspected of violations such as posting censored content. In 2016, the cyber police in Baiyun District, Guiyang City directly investigated 85 people. Cyber police in the neighboring Yunyan district were even more aggressive, reporting 200 similar investigations in the same year. Penalties for harmful online activities include detention, fines, and “criticism and education.”
Cyber police use several tactics to detect the identity of violators and potential violators. One approach is to track IP addresses, which are unique identifiers associated with local networks that connect to the broader Internet. This is easy to do as online access is provided by state-owned telecommunications companies. However, more sophisticated users can avoid this type of identification by routing their online traffic to a virtual private network. Additionally, additional measures are needed to identify the owners of social media accounts that allow anonymous posting. In February 2015, new rules required all internet users to enter their real names when registering accounts in chat rooms, the popular messaging app WeChat, the highly active microblogging service Weibo, and all other social media. It was mandatory to do so.
Cyber police also monitor access points such as Internet cafes and public Wi-Fi networks in hotels, shopping malls, airports, and other locations to identify users beyond their home networks. (Internet cafes are still widely used, especially among gamers, although they are not as common now as they were in the early 2000s.) Regulation helps with this. In 2001, the government required private Internet cafes, which were supposed to require ID from all users, to retain customer information, including ID and online activity, for 60 days. Internet cafe operators must also obtain a license from the Department of Culture, the government agency that regulates local PSBs and the entertainment sector. Recent regulations require Internet cafes to install ID card readers and allow online access only after customers scan an ID with identifying information, such as a color mugshot.
Similar regulations were in place before the introduction of cyber police, but enforcement was lax. Cyber police are now strictly enforcing these rules and even training Internet cafe “security guards.” Security guards will likely ensure compliance with regulations and perhaps monitor customers. Some jurisdictions may also require internet cafes to have cameras installed to monitor customers.
When it comes to monitoring public Wi-Fi networks, local cyber police began requiring carriers to implement unspecified “security technical measures” in the late 2000s. National efforts in this area are thought to have begun in 2014. That year, for example, Wuhan police launched a three-year program to introduce a “security management system” to all public Wi-Fi networks. In 2016, Yunyan PSB installed his 560 public Wi-Fi surveillance systems. Thousands of similar systems were installed in two counties in Sichuan province between 2017 and 2018. The average price of a Wi-Fi monitoring device is approximately $306, indicating that this monitoring program requires significant resources, including post-installation maintenance and operating costs.
Cyberpolice pays special attention to users designated as “persons of interest,” i.e., users blacklisted by local authorities for engaging in activities deemed a threat to regime security and public safety. Masu. These are likely to overlap with political dissidents, liberal academics, human rights activists, members of illegal religious groups, and practitioners of Falun Gong and other movements considered “evil cults” by the state. The main figures reportedly include prominent pro-government figures, indicating the party’s paranoia towards people who enjoy the support of many people, regardless of their political loyalty. .
The number of online principals varies by region in China, demonstrating that jurisdictions have wide discretion in making these designations. In 2018, 100 important people were placed under surveillance in Hengyang County. Cyber police in Oroqen City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region claimed that 25 people were under surveillance in 2015. Yunhe District, Changzhou City, reported that police had direct contact with 62 key figures in 2016. However, some jurisdictions have identified many more individuals. In 2018, 1,141 people, or approximately 0.3% of the population, were under surveillance in Yoshiyama Prefecture. From 2011 to 2014, Dancheng County’s cyber police “registered and managed” 3,475 key persons, about 0.4% of the population.
Little has been made public about how China monitors key figures, but this is one of China’s most important surveillance tactics, as it allows authorities to track individuals most likely to cause trouble. It is one. At least cyber police appear to have special files on targets, as reported in some jurisdictions. For example, according to a report issued by Uchie City’s PSB in February 2011, the cyber police force collects basic information about all kinds of important people and scrutinizes them using “various technical means.” and was instructed to appoint a police officer to conduct the investigation. Unidentified special police database to verify your identity online. The report also mentions real-time monitoring of targets through information obtained from internet service providers and internet cafes.
Such distributed surveillance systems have enabled the Chinese surveillance state to control the cyberspace battlefield and neutralize threats to the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. Like other forms of preventive repression, these tactics allow states to monitor the activities of regime opponents and restrict their freedom of action.
This surveillance state relies on the Chinese Communist Party’s strengths in organization and mobilization. New professional bureaucracies (in this case cyber agencies and cyber police) are rapidly formed to carry out central state policy. Technology is important, but so is informant and police investigation and intimidation. China’s success in dominating the cyberspace battlefield reveals the Chinese Communist Party’s tactical adaptability in the face of new threats to its hold on power. Rather, it shows that one should never underestimate the party’s determination or ability to perpetuate its rule.